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I. INTRODUCTION
"If insurance is a small world that reflects the purposes of the larger world
outside it,"' then the events of September 11 have dealt a devastating blow to
both worlds. In the larger world, even as images of the now infamous terrorist
attacks at the World Trade Center (hereinafter WTC) linger in our minds, the
rubble is being cleared away, and life has slowly returned to a familiar
normalcy. However, in the smaller world of insurance, there is an ongoing
struggle between factions, each striving to find the best solution to a problem
whose consequences may be as dire as the events that created the controversy.
The impact of September 11 is without peer. The terrorist attacks that on
that fateful day dealt the world's insurance community its hardest blow ever.
The shock that such an event could happen was only made worse by the
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I. Spencer Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory
of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 524 (1961), cited in Neil H. Wyland & Jonathan I. Katz, As the
Dust Settles: Emerging Issues in the Wake ofSeptember 11, 12 NO. 17 ANDREWS INS. COVERAGE LITIG.
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realization that the insurance industry's estimates for such an event fell so
short.' The previous largest worldwide-insured loss was from Hurricane
Andrew in 1992. 3 Damages in Florida resulting from the natural disaster are
now estimated to have caused $20 billion in insured losses.4 Estimates of losses
in the WTC attacks by the insurance industry ranges between $30 and $60
billion. The National Association of Independent Insurers (hereinafter NAII)
spokesperson said, "[Liosses from the attacks are estimated at $50 billion."5
One independent financial-counseling firm estimated that on a combined basis
for property, casualty, life, and health insurance, the WTC property losses might
reach $58 billion.6 Although no one yet knows the total losses from September
11, if the losses reach $60 billion the attacks will have caused insured losses
three times greater than any previous event.7
Prior to the attacks on the WTC, the United States insurance industry
treated terrorism as little more than a footnote8, while other countries, such as
Great Britain, have repeatedly been forced to deal with the issue. Repeated
bombings and terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Armies (hereinafter IRA)
resulted in British insurance agencies re-evaluating their insurance policies.9
While many United States insurers will not use their war exclusions (discussed
below) to avoid paying for September 11 losses, many are looking for ways to
avert payment on future losses from terrorist attacks.' 0
2. Dr. Gordon Woo, Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk, 2 (prepared for the National Bureau
of Economic Research meeting, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Feb. 1, 2002).
3. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 9 (2001).
(Tillinghast-Towers Perrin is one of the world's largest global management consulting firms, assisting
organizations in managing people, performance and risk; HR consultants help organizations manage their
investment in people to achieve measurable performance improvements, focusing on human resource strategy
and service delivery, benefit and compensation design and implementation (including retirement, health and
welfare and executive compensation), employee and organizational communication, HR technology and
outsourced HR administration, providing actuarial and management consulting to financial services companies
worldwide; and providing reinsurance intermediary services and consulting expertise that focus on the creative
blending of traditional and nontraditional risk-transfer vehicles.).
4. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, WHY DO WE NEED FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR
TERRORISM? 1 (2001).
5. Martha Neil, Terrorism Insurance Bailouts Stall In Congress, 2002 ABA J. E-REPORT 3, 2.
(Joseph Annotti is the spokesman for the NAIl, a Chicago based Association of Insurers.).
6. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 3, at 4. (These estimates were based on information
available approximately one week following the event.).
7. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 4.
8. Bernard Wasow, The Debate Over Federal Insurance Against Terrorism, THE CENTURY
FOUNDATION HOMELAND SECURITY PROJECT 2 (2002).
9. Alan J. Fleming, Terrorism Coverage in the United Kingdom, 1 (1999), available at
http://www.drj.com/special/wtc/w3065.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
10. JAMES G. RIzzO, TRAGEDY'S AFTERMATH: THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY,
46 FEB B. B.J. 10 (2002).
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The insurance industry, which incurred billions in losses, may not be able
to afford another enormous payout without aid. Even with federal help, another
terrorist attack would be a tremendous blow to the insurance industry." The
idea that total losses from the WTC attacks will not be known for months, if not
years, and the uncertainty of future attacks, have increased certain fears; can
reinsurers cover losses that insurance companies are now struggling to meet,
and if not, then should the federal government get involved? "While new
security measures and the war against terrorism will hopefully diminish the risk,
it is nearly impossible to quantify the probabilities of what might happen over
the next few months or years."'
' 2
The United States insurance industry must choose a course that allows
insurance rates to remain stable, while ensuring that insurers can handle the
payouts that will follow another terrorist attack. Either insurers will have to
honor terrorism insurance claims or the Federal Government will have to get
involved.
II. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY PRE-SEPTEMBER 11
Currently, there is no Federal insurance system. '" All fifty states have
their own rules, 4 and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
guides state-by-state coverage. 5 Since September 11, there have been deep
concerns regarding the insurance industry's ability to provide coverage for
future terrorist attacks.'6 Without aid, many primary insurance companies will
11. Id.
12. Stephen P. Lowe, A Federal Role for Terrorism Risk The Last Word, TILLINGHAST-TOWERS
PERRIN 1 (2001). (While new security measures and the war against terrorism will hopefully diminish the
risk, it is nearly impossible to quantify the probabilities of what might happen over the next few months or
years.).
13. As of June 2002, proposals are being considered by Congress to create Federal Reinsurance as
a backstop for future terrorist attacks. As of August 5, 2002, neither Chamber has passed the others proposal.
14. Heidi A. Lawson, Insurance Regulation: The Effects of September llth, 673 PLIILIT 53, 58
2002.
In 1868 the United States Supreme Court heard Paul v. State of Virginia, and held that
insurance was a contract that was delivered locally and was, therefore, not interstate
commerce. The court held that insurance regulation by the states was constitutional.
Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), see also United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, et al., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), (To the surprise of many in the
industry, the United States Supreme Court ruled that federal antitrust laws applied to
insurance.). In response to the South-Eastern ruling, Congress passed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act which, subject to certain restrictions, allowed state regulation to preempt
federal law when it came to the "business of insurance."
15. The NAIC works with the states to create uniformity between insurance providers.
16. GFOA Issue Brief, Insurance Liability, 2 (Jan. I, 2002), available at
http://www.gfoa.org/flc/briefs/062702/insurance.06.02.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
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pull terrorism coverage, as will the reinsurance companies. Speaking on the
effects of going without terrorism insurance, President George W. Bush stated
that, "If people can't buy insurance on a ... project, they're not going to build
the project. And if they don't build the project, somebody's not working."' 7
While this may be a simplification, it is accurate. To get insurance, businesses
and individuals will have to pay high premiums, or go ahead without insurance
and pray that nothing bad happens. Neither option is favorable, and both put the
buyer at a disadvantage.
Insurance "represents the delicate balance between the uncertainty and the
predictability of future events associated with unfavorable consequences."' 8
Basically, "insurance is the sharing of risk by many parties so as not to create
a financial hardship should loss affect one of the parties."' 9 Insurance creates
a pool that allows many participants to share the risk of an event with other
purchasers. Each purchaser receives protection against substantial but uncertain
losses in exchange for making regular payments called premiums. The system
is based upon the "Law of Large Numbers" and uses statistical models based on
data gathered from past experiences.2° By gathering this information, the
insurance industry can forecast future losses and create resources to pay claims.
17. Press Release, Remarks by the President to Business Leaders (Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020408-17.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
18. Jane Kendall, The Incalculable Risk: How the World Trade Center Disaster Accelerated The
Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 572 (2002).
19. James E. Branigan, Insurance and Risk Management In Commercial Real Estate Transaction,
2002: A New World of Concerns, 478 PLI/REAL 495, 501 (2002).
20. Kendall, supra note 18, at 572-73.
The 'Law of Large Numbers' is the statistical proposition that the more opportunities
exist for an event to occur, the closer the actual relationship of occurrences to
opportunities will be to the true probability. Lewis C. Workman, The Mathematical
Foundations of Life Insurance 121 (1982). Once the true probability is estimated by
observing a large sample of events, it must then be applied to a large number of
exposures before the actual occurrences will approximate the true probability. Emmett
J. Vaughan & Therese M. Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance 25 (7th ed.
1996). Extremely catastrophic events are generally considered to be uninsurable in part
because by nature they fail to conform to models based on the Law of Large Numbers.
Riegel et al., supra note 10, at 20-21. Past experience with events of such great
magnitude is usually too sparse to accurately predict how often a similar event can be
expected to occur. Id. Further, where a particular loss is grossly disproportionate to
other losses that can be anticipated to occur within the pool of policyholders, the
catastrophic loss invalidates the calculation of rates and has the potential to create
insolvency for the insurer. Id."
While primary insurers deal with businesses and individuals,2' reinsurers
deal with primary insurers. Reinsurance companies are the "wholesalers in
risk,,22 dealing only with other insurance companies. As a result, they are not
very visible, but they are vital to the industry, since without them, primary
insurers would not be able to diversify their risks properly. 23  They provide
insurance between the primary insurance company and another party, usually
when the primary insurer assumes a policy too large to handle alone.24
"A 'reinsurance' contract is an agreement where one insurance company,
the reinsurer, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, the reinsured,
either in whole or in part against loss or liability the latter may incur under a
separate and original contract of insurance with a third party, the original
insured. '25 Reinsurers, like primary insurers, look to the past to set their rates.26
Resulting losses from the September 11 WTC attack, the 1993 WTC attack, and
the destruction of the Alfred J . Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
have proven that the insurance industry is unable accurately measure the costs
of future attacks.27 These past attacks gave little predictability in what manner
future attacks would take, and gave even less insight into losses in life, property,
and business.28
The problem with what happened on September 11 is that it presented
a risk that no one could conceive would happen. When the buildings
were built, loss scenarios did contemplate the impact of one Boeing
707 (the largest commercial aircraft at the time), however the idea of
two, fully fueled 767s hitting both towers was unimaginable.29
21. Wasow, supra note 8, at 3.
Primary insurers essential activities are risk assessment, estimation of expected losses
(underwriting), claims settlement, financial management of reserves against expected
future losses, and management of insured risks. Both risk management and financial
management involve the creation of a diversified portfolio of assets, liabilities, and
expected liabilities that produces good returns at low risk for the insurance companies.
22. Id. at 1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sandra Mulay Casey, J.D., Lisa Della Rocca Gregory, J.D., et al., Insurance Contracts and
Coverage, 46 TEX. JUR. 3d. Insurance Contracts and Coverage § 1155, 1 (2002).
26. Kendall, supra note 18, at 573.
27. Honorable Paul H. O'Neill, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, United States Senate (Oct. 24, 2001).
28. Terror Insurance Availability: Hearing on Terrorism Insurance Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of John
T. Sinnott, Chairman and CEO, Marsh, Inc.), 2001 WL 26187268. See also Blackest Day as Insurers Fear
for Staff, Ins. Day (London), Sept. 12, 2001, at 1. ("The unprecedented events of yesterday are generally not
even found in the 'worst case scenarios' run by some firms", cited in Kendall, supra note 18, note 38).
29. Statement of John T. Sinnott, supra note 28.
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Certain situations known as clash events result in a breakdown of the
reinsurance system. "In a clash event, an occurrence, often unanticipated or
unpredictable but of catastrophic proportions, concentrates significant losses
across multiple lines of insurance simultaneously."3 The WTC disaster created
massive insurance claims in aviation, property, liability, life, workers'
compensation, and business interruption.3t When the primary insurers turned
to the reinsurance companies, many found them to be spread too thin to
adequately cover the tremendous losses.
If the WTC attacks are the worst known terrorist attack in the history of the
insurance industry,32 then the potential that reinsurers and primary insurers may
not be able to cover their policy holder's claims may be the insurance industry's
greatest failure. To combat this real possibility, many in the industry are
looking to avoid this situation when reinsurance policies come up for renewal.
When reinsurance companies who provide insurance to primary insurers began
to renew their contracts in January 2002 (reinsurance policies are annual, and
renegotiated every year), many reinsurers refused to provide coverage for losses
relating to terrorist acts.
HIL. EXCLUSIONS - WAR V. TERRORISM
Following the terrorist attacks, primary insurers "assured their policy
holders that they would not invoke the 'war' exclusion to deny coverage.3 On
its face, this appeared to be a magnanimous gesture, but in actuality, these
insurance carriers had no alternative. As presently written, the standard war
exclusion does not explicitly extend to acts of terrorism."35 Congress also made
its position crystal clear when it stated that any attempts by insurance agencies
to side-step their contractual obligations would "not only be unsupportable, it
would be unpatriotic."36
30. Kendall, supra note 18, at 580.
31. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 3, at 4.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Nicole Belson Goluboff, Passing Terrorism Insurance Legislation: How Telework and Flextime
Work Arrangements Can Help, FINDLAW CORPORATE COUNSEL CENTER, (May 6, 2002), available at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20020506-goluboff.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
34. Rizzo, supra note 10, at 10.
35. 'Act of War' Exclusion Doesn't Apply to Attacks, Insurers Say, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 17, 2001), at
Business, 3.
36. Letter from the House Committee on Financial Services to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners I (Sept. 17, 2001). ("Any attempt to evade coverage obligations by either primary insurers
or reinsurers based on such legal maneuvering would not only be unsupportable and unpatriotic - it would tear
at the faith of the American people in the insurance industry.").
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This has left many primary carries in an unpleasant situation. Primary
insurers were left with a very simple, yet unpleasant decision; cover the risk and
hope that the losses do not exceed the ability to pay.37 However, this is an
almost impossible task, considering that the market is based on predicable losses
for a certain event and there are no possible ways to accurately predict damages
from acts of terrorism. 38 Some primary insurers can try to limit or exclude
terrorism coverage completely. Many primary insurers who cannot find
reinsurance companies to cover acts of terrorism are doing just that.39
A major issue that reinsures and primary insurers face is ambiguous policy
language. The distance between "war" and "terrorism", may not seem great, but
it could be the difference in billions of dollars to insurance providers. Most
insurance policies exclude losses from declared war or losses from invasion by
a sovereign power, but lack language that would address coverage in the face
of a terrorist attack.'
"Exclusions for losses arising from acts of terrorism, although rare, are not
completely unknown in existing United States policies."'4  The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that war risk insurers already had
circulated various versions of exclusions for terrorist activities, stating,
Any of these ... clauses, if employed by the appellant all risk insurers
might well have excluded the present loss... When the all risk
insurers failed to exclude political acts in words descriptive of today's
world events, they acted at their own peril. The clear implication of
this is that it is possible to exclude coverage for damages and injuries
caused by terrorist acts with the proper policy language.42
President Bush said, "The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were
carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They
were acts of war. 4 3 Yet, the tragic events of September 11 are not covered
under existing "war" insurance exclusions. Therefore, insurance agencies
cannot claim the September 1 1 attacks were those of "war." A terrorist group,
other than a de facto government or entity acting on behalf of a government,
37. Marjorie Segale, The Event That Changed The World of Insurance, TERRORISM REPORT,
IBA WEST, VOL. 1, NO. 1, 2, (2002).
38. Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
39. Segale, supra note 37, at 2.
40. Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
41. Sherman-Williams Co. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 863 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("
'[Tlerrorist' exclusion was in standard form policy at issue and coverage for losses due to terrorist acts was
restored by endorsement, for which insured paid additional premium.").
42. Carl J. Pernicone & James T.H. Deaver, Insurance Implications of the World Trade Center
Disaster, 31 -SPG BRIEF 23, 26 (2002).
43. Quoted in Kendall, supra note 18, at 569.
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cannot commit an act of war. 4  For a terrorism exclusions to apply, the
contractual language should stipulate that a terrorist act may, but need not, be
committed by or on behalf of a group that comprises a de facto government or
a recognized government. Without this clause, small factions will not apply to
the terms of the war exclusion. 5
"The actions of a 'tiny non-governmental entity' fighting the United States
do not constitute 'war' between the United States and that entity., 46 If the
insurance industry is going to exclude terrorism coverage, insurers should make
it clear that the size of a terrorist organization is not relevant to the
determination as to whether or not its act is excluded.47 "Words describing
violent events commonly used in war-risk exclusions are construed as having
'dimensions besides the level of violence,' which may include requirements that
multiple actors be involved."" Hence, while the terrorist acts of the Al Queda
organization may demand an answer, they were not acts borne from a
recognized war.
In the days following September 11, many observed that this attack was
so well planned, so meticulously masterminded, that it had to have been the
work of an extremely well funded and organized terrorist network.49 Osama bin
Laden's terrorist network, Al Queda, is a non-governmental entity, and a self-
proclaimed terrorism organization. A "war," whether declared or undeclared,
can exist only where sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities engage in hostilities.5°
Terrorism exclusions should clearly specify that terrorist acts may be committed
on behalf of or sponsored by any sovereign or quasi-sovereign entity.5' While
some reports claim that bin Laden was a Taliban Defense Minister, the use of
extremists, rather than soldiers, to hijack and crash airplanes into the WTC
barely constitutes a foreign states involvement 2.5  Therefore, contrary to
President Bush's statements, the horrible attacks on the WTC cannot be
considered acts of "war", 3
Acts of terrorism are not included in standard insurance policies, where
similar acts of destruction are expressly excluded from coverage in acts of war,
44. Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 at 1012; see
also Welts v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.Y. 34, 40 (1871), cited in supra note 16, at 577-78.
45. Branigan, supra note 19, at 532.
46. Kendall, supra note 18, at 592.
47. Id.
48. Kendall, supra note 18, at 592-93
49. Woo, supra note 2, at 4.
50. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1005; see also New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Bennion, 158 F.2d 260,264 (1 0th Cir. 1946); Vanderbilt v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 55 (1920), cited
in 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 592.
51. Pan American, 505 F.2d at 1005.
52. Pernicone, supra note 42.
53. Wasow, supra note 8, at 5.
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hence the "war exclusion." "Few insurance policies underwritten for domestic
risks contained exclusionary language for acts of terrorism. All, however,
excluded coverage for damages to persons or property that were the result of an
act of war."54 War, is a "hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried
on between nations, states or rulers, or between citizens in the same nation or
state.1
55
Terrorism, however, is defined as "the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives."56 Should the United States be subjected to future acts of terrorism
as a result of its military activities, insurance carriers may be able to invoke the
war exclusion and terrorism exclusion, or the insurance agency may select to
combine war and terrorism into one exclusion policy, to preclude coverage for
resulting personal injury or property damage losses.57
IV. THE PROBLEM DEFINING "OCCURRENCE"
In the aftermath of the WTC attacks, many questions have been raised
regarding the ability of insurance companies to compensate policy holders for
losses caused by the terrorist's acts. The most costly risk facing the insurance
industry is the difference between one occurrence and multiple occurrences.
One attack may result in fifty billion dollars in insured losses. But if the events
of September 11 were defined as two attacks, the amount that can be collected
under the WTC policy would double.58  The problem stems from an
interpretation of the term "occurrence."
"Insurers and reinsurers are familiar with disputes over situations in which
a determination as to the number of occurrences can have major financial
significance. '59 Determining the number of occurrences has drastic impacts on
54. Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
55, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (6th ed. 1991).
56, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2001), cited in Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
57, Id.
58. Neil H. Wyland & Jonathan I. Katz, As the Dust Settles: Emerging Issues in the Wake of
September 11, 12 No. 17 ANDREWS INS. COVERAGE LITIG. REP. II, 1 (2002).
The largest insured losses from the events of September I I arise from the attacks on
the World Trade Center. An issue that could literally double the size of WTC-related
property losses is whether the attacks on the WTC constitute one occurrence/event or
two under the involved direct insurance policies. The issue will also arise under the
reinsurance agreements that protect those policies. Lawsuits have already been filed
on that issue in the direct insurance context.
59. John W. Stamper, Looking at the Events of September 11: Some Effects and Implications, While
the Impact on Insurers is Large and Apparent, there are Many Other Possibilities, Even Probabilities, of
Contentions and Litigation, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 152, 159 (2002). (Environmental policies are familiar
insurance claims.).
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the ability of policyholders to collect, and affects both primary insurers and
reinsurers."0 The question that will beg this analysis is: was the occurrence
multiple hijacked aircrafts that crashed into multiple buildings, or was the
occurrence a single and unified terrorist plot that destroyed the three buildings?
"If the cause or occurrence is deemed the terrorist plot then the case in the
federal courts may call the destroyed buildings one occurrence. If each plain
crash is a separate incident then the incidents may be ruled separate
occurrences."
61
"Given their close coordination, were all four attacks one occurrence?
Were they all separate? Were the attacks on the World Trade Center one
occurrence regardless of the others? ' 62 "If the decision is one loss, the insurers
will be liable for the occurrence limit in the policy. ' 63 Larry A. Silverstein, the
WTC leaseholder, says each airplane crash involved in the disaster constitutes
a separate "occurrence." 64 If this were true, then a finding of two "occurrences"
would double the $3.6 billion Silverstein would collect to $7.2 billion.65
Several insurance companies that cover other property damaged in the
WTC attacks believe "that because the attacks were coordinated, they qualify
as a single occurrence. ' 66  The New York Court of Appeals answered the
question of how to determining the "number of occurrences" of an event. 67 The
60. Id.
61. Branigan, supra note 19, at 532.
62. Stamper, supra note 59, at 152.
63. Branigan, supra note 19, at 532.
64. Pernicone, supra note 42, at 27.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27-8.
On October 16, 2001, the court firmly rejected a ceding company's attempt in two
separate cases to characterize underlying environmental claims arising from numerous
different sites across the country into one "disaster and/or casualty" per insured. The
two cases were resolved by the court in a single opinion, Travelers Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's of London, cases 123 and 124. The cases
stemmed from pollution-related claims against two separate industrial insureds, E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. and Koppers Company (n/k/a Beazer East, Inc.). Both insureds
submitted insurance claims to Travelers after incurring substantial expenses associated
with different sites across the country, where they had been held responsible for the
release of hazardous substances into the environment. Travelers ultimately settled with
each company for substantial sums. Travelers had reinsurance treaties with Lloyd's that
obligated Travelers reinsurers to cover "each and every loss" exceeding a retention
level. Travelers argued in both cases that it could aggregate the losses from multiple
environmentally contaminated sites owned by the respective insureds as one "disaster
and/or casualty" per insured under the wording of the reinsurance contracts at issue.
Under the facts of each case, that position, if upheld, would mean that Travelers could
surmount the retention limits in the treaties and thus be entitled to a recovery. Travelers
based its argument primarily on a 1996 decision by the English House of Lords, Axa
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court looked at the acts necessitating coverage, and the policy language, which
said, " ... all loss[es] resulting from a series of accidents, occurrences and/or
causative incidents having a common origin and/or being traceable to the same
act, omission, error and/or mistake shall be considered as having resulted from
a single accident, occurrence and/or causative event. '68  The court said "the
phrase 'series of created a requirement of a temporal and spatial relationship
among any accidents to be aggregated under the wording.... Thus, [an] attempt
to treat the ... claims ... as one 'disaster and/or casualty' for ... allocating
related costs ... was barred by the policy language. 69
In October of 2001, SR International Business Insurance (Swiss Re), filed
a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of New York in order to
resolve the question: How many occurrences took place on September 11,
2001 ? Swiss Re provided the World Trade Center policyholders coverage in
excess of a $10 million. Swiss Re asserts that the policy drafted by the WTC
leaseholders' insurance broker, Willis Ltd. States that the term "occurrence,"
is defined as: "[A]ll losses or damages that are attributable directly or indirectly
to one cause or one series of similar causes. All such losses will be added
together ... will be treated as one occurrence irrespective of the period of time
Reinsurance v. Field, 5 Re LR 184.
68. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 734 N.Y.S.2d 531,
535 (N.Y. 2001).
69. Pemicone, supra note 42, at 28.
70. SR International Business Insurance Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties LLC, 2002 WL
1163577 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
In that action, 'Plaintiff Swiss Re' seeks, inter alia, declaratory relief regarding the
insurance entitlements of Defendants. In response to the SR Int'l Complaint, the
Silverstein Properties asserted counterclaims against numerous other insurers seeking
monetary and declaratory relief in the SR Int'l action. (World Trade Center Properties
LLC, et al. Am. Answer & Countercls., filed on February 6, 2002). The extent of the
liability of the insurance carriers may ultimately depend upon resolution of the
question: Which of the two following statements best describes what caused the
destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001) In a single coordinated
attack, terrorists flew hijacked planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center.2)
At 8:46 A.M. on the morning of September 11 th, a hijacked airliner crashed into the
North Tower of the World Trade Center, and 16 minutes later a second hijacked plane
struck the South Tower. Since most property damage insurance is written on a 'per
occurrence' basis- the maximum insured amount will be paid for each covered
occurrence-the Court would normally expect to find the answer to the question
whether the events of September 1 th constituted one or two "occurrences" by looking
at how the parties to the insurance contract defined that term in the policy they
negotiated. In the case of the World Trade Center, however, with minor exceptions,
there were no insurance policies in place on September I Ith, although each of the
insurers had signed binders setting forth in summary form their agreement to provide
property damage coverage. Some of these binders expressly stated that the precise
language was 'to be agreed upon.
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or the area over which such losses occur."'71 The WTC policyholders claim,
"that Swiss Re agreed to a policy form underwritten by The Travelers Indemnity
Company and the definition of occurrence would be scrutinized under New
York law. 72 Under New York law, an "occurrence" is defined as an "event of
an unfortunate character that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation. '73 The Second Circuit has interpreted this to mean that "although
a single 'occurrence' may give rise to multiple claims ... courts should look to
the event for which the insured is held liable, not some point further back in the
causal chain."74
Many courts have created two rules for determining how to treat multiple
instances of damage stemming from more than one occurrence. "The ... most
broadly accepted rule is the so-called 'cause' test ... wherein all losses arising
from the same 'cause' are treated as one occurrence. 75 The effect test, an
earlier but now largely discredited approach, looked to the "effect of causes in
determining whether there were multiple 'occurrences.' While many courts
have adopted the cause approach, in practice, however, 'cause' may have many
different meanings. "76 However the courts decide to fall on this matter may
likely be the difference between insurers covering their policies or falling short.
V. OTHER OPTIONS: GREAT BRITAIN'S POOL RE
"A basic principle of insurance is the reduction of overall risk by pooling
or spreading individual, independent risks. 77  An insurers' inability to
accurately estimate potential losses can be detrimental, to say the least. Insurers
gauge the risk associated with an activity, and then assign an amount that they
will cover (reimburse) on the chance that the event will occur. The attacks on
the WTC shed light on the major problem the insurance agency is now facing:
71. Swiss Re Complaint 3 1.
72. WTC Leaseholders'Answer and Counterclaim 175, cited in Rizzo, supra note 10, at 15. ("New
York subscribes to the "unfortunate event" test to determine the number of 'occurrences' that have taken
place.").
73. Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 164 N.E. 2d 704, 707 (N.Y.
1959).
74. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1213 (2d Cir. 1995).
75. Michael F. Aylward, Twin Towers: The $3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade
Center Attacks, 9/11 and its Aftermath, Was it One "Occurrence" or More Than One? There are Complexities
Galore that are Bound to Arise in the Insurance Context, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 169, 172 (2002).
76. Id. at 172-73. ("For the most part, ... where two losses occur close to each other in time and
space as the result of a continuous physical cause, most courts have ruled that they should be treated as arising
out of the same occurrence.").
77. Lowe, supra note 12, at I. ("But this principle can break down if a single event affects many
insureds simultaneously. Geographic concentration or concentration of coverage within an industry (e.g.,
asbestos manufacturers) creates the potential for contagion.").
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either no one predicted how much damage could be caused, or at the very least,
no one accurately predicted the possible scope of damage.
If the private insurance industry cannot underwrite the new risk of
terrorism, then a strong rationale exists for a federal role. In the
United States, such precedents include the federal flood insurance
program and federal riot reinsurance. A more recent example is Pool
Re, the U.K. reinsurance program covering terrorist acts.78
A. The Evolution of Britain's Pool Re
As in the United States, British losses stemming from acts of terrorism
were covered under standard insurance policies. Like the United States, Great
Britain's insurance industry assumed that insured losses from acts of terrorism
would be minimal. 79 However, the United Kingdom suffered several terrorist
attacks, which culminated in the 1992 bombing of St. Mary Axe, London,
where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) caused damages in excess of £350
million in commercial property damages.80 After this, the British "realized that
the unlimited coverage of claims due to terrorism might turn out to be quite
expensive."
81
After the St. Mary Axe attack, the insurance and reinsurance industry
recognized that they were not able to estimate an accurate determination of
damages resulting from further terrorist attacks.82 Without having the ability to
cover losses, or to come close to predicting damages, reinsurers canceled
terrorism coverage, and the primary insurance companies followed. "The
situation soon became highly political, and enormous pressure was put on both
the insurance market and the British government to find some solution to the
problem., 83
The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers in Industry and
Commerce (AIRMIC), the risk management community, the U.K. broker
community, the British Insurance and Investment Brokers Association (BIBA),
and the Association of British Insurers gathered to answer the dilemma they
now faced: how to insure an uninsurable act? Risks that are considered
78. Id.
79. Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Property Insurance in Britain, University of Lausanne, at 7
(1998).
80. Fleming, supra note 9, at 2.
81. von Ungem-Stemberg, supra note 79, at 7.
82. Fleming, supra note 9, at 2.
83. Id. (Many policies, both in the United Kingdom and the United States renew on or by the first
day of the new year. "Since the time scale was so short for those who had renewals on January 1, 1993, there
was a horrified outcry from the Association of Insurance and Risk Managers in Industry and Commerce and
the risk management community.").
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uninsurable have the following characteristics: there are no "objective
probabilities that can be used to calculate premium levels; even individual
claims can cost large absolute amounts; and geographically the claims are
concentrated on a few regions."' Ultimately a scheme was devised that was
hoped "would maximize the traditional insurance market capacity while
requiring government backing.""5 This scheme became Pool Re.
Pool Re is "a government-backed insurance facility in which the
Department of Trade acts as a reinsurer of last resort to the insurance market."86
"Pool Re's reinsurance contract provides coverage only against acts of terrorism
as defined in the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act [of] 1993."" 7 Pool Re,
which was created by "an amalgam of local British Insurers, Lloyd's syndicates,
overseas insurers and captives,"" is a "mutual insurance company, established
and regulated in the same manner as any normal insurance company."89 Each
company that agrees to take part in Pool Re agrees not to provide terrorism
coverage themselves; thereby removing competition from other privately
backed insurance companies.9"
"Pool Re is unique to the commercial property insurance market. Pool Re
does not provide reinsurance for the homes, personal property or cars of private
individuals, or ... reinsurance for terrorist losses on other policies."'"
The pool is reinsured by the British government, meaning that
insurers' liability is capped, giving them a ten percent profit or loss-
making potential. If the scheme runs badly then everyone who has
put premium into the system is obligated to fund another ten percent
of premium before the government reinsurance applies.92
"The primary insurer is responsible for the first £100,000 (about $150,000)
under each section of the policy (building, contents, business interruption, etc.),
84. von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 79, at 8. ("The St. Mary Axe bombing is a good illustration
of how high the claims for one individual event can be. As regards the geographic distribution, it was assumed
the IRA would concentrate its 'efforts' on the City and perhaps the business centers of other large towns.").
85. Fleming, supra note 9, at 2.
86. Id. at 3.
87. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, UPDATE 2 (2001), available at
http://www.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/publications/till-update-ukUkPoolRe-andTerroris
m/20020521 I 1.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
88. Fleming, supra note 9, at 3.
89. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 1.
90. Fleming, supra note 9, at 3.
91. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 2. ([S]uch as liability, aviation, workers'
compensation and accidental death.).
92. Fleming, supra note 9, at 3.
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with Pool Re covering the excess up to the limits of primary coverage. 93 Any
insurer in Great Britain offering commercial property insurance can be a Pool
Re member, but is not obliged to join.94 Insurers who want to refrain from
joining Pool Re, but want to continue offering terrorism insurance, "may offer
cover[age] without protection against terrorism, may try to find terrorism
reinsurance cover[age] in the private market, or may operate without
reinsurance protection."9  Insurers who want join Pool Re enter into a
membership agreement, essentially purchasing reinsurance from the Pool Re.96
Once a member, primary insurers must exclude acts of terrorism in their
standard commercial property policies, charge separate premiums for terrorism
coverage, and yield 100 percent of the premium charged for Pool Re.97
"According to its annual returns to the Financial Services Authority, at the
end of December 2000, the accumulated surplus amounted to £665 million."9"
Pool Re pays its claims by accumulated underwriting profits. If there are no
profits, Pool Re can "call for an assessment on its members of up to 10 percent
of their current-year ceded premiums. If this is still insufficient, then Pool Re
may draw on any investment income it has accumulated to pay claims." 99 If
there are outstanding claims that cannot be covered by Pool Re, the government
will act as a last resort measure, to which there is no limit.' ° However, if the
93. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 2.
The standard commercial property policy specifically excludes coverage for such
defined acts of terrorism above the deductible and then restores cover-age for them via
a standard endorsement. The insured can purchase coverage under this endorsement
for an earmarked additional premium. In effect, Pool Re provides an automatic
facultative excess of loss cover with retention of £100,000 per coverage section. On
the excess, Pool Re provides 100 percent quota share coverage.
94. von Ungem-Sternberg, supra note 79, at 9.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id. at 1.
Pool Re sets its premium rates using nor-mal commercial considerations, and uses risk
factors of its own choosing - including the location of the insured property. Discounts
are available if the insured engages in prescribed risk management programs. Pool Re
reviews its premium rates on a regular basis with the assistance of independent
consulting actuaries.
98. Id. at 3.
Pool Re's capital is its own, and is built up entirely from its accumulated profits.
According to its annual returns to the Financial Services Authority, at the end of
December 2000 the accumulated surplus amounted to £665 million. Pool Re may
borrow, and the government guarantees any loans or other lines of credit, but it has
never made use of this ability.
99. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 3.
100. Id. at 4.
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proceeds from member's premiums exceed £1 billion, then Pool Re must pay
a premium to the government. "'
The United Kingdom's Pool Re system was created so that the taxpayer is
insulated from immediately being hit with heightened premiums, or worse, not
being able to recoup their losses. Pool Re is actually a five-tiered program,
where different layers are set in place to meet the losses that policyholders may
receive following a terrorist attack.' 2 "Following an attack, the insurance
company pays the first £100,000 per coverage type, with no government
reimbursement. Insurers contribute premiums to fully capitalize and maintain
a national pool, paying out all claims directly from the pool once the deductible
is met.' 1
03
In the instance where the losses exceed the pool, the insurance agency must
pay up to an additional ten percent of that year's premium. If the damages or
claims exceed that amount, then the investment income earned by the pool is
used to cover the difference. " If these contingencies fail, then the Government
will help to cover the expenses. However, since Pool Re's inception, the United
Kingdom's government has not been forced to step in to bail out the system.1
0 5
Pool Re has curtailed governmental involvement to simply being there to
cover Pool Re when its coffers are too low to cover claims."'° The system
works by giving the customer insurance while allowing the provider to make
some profit. This is accomplished when the primary insurance companies
collect premiums from policyholders, of which the insurance company is paid
five percent. 0 7 While Pool Re pays coverage from it's collection of premiums
101. Id.
In that case, the total premium payable by Pool Re over the lifetime of its agreement
with the government will be equal to the greater of: 10 percent of the sum of the net
premiums plus compound interest it has received, or the sum of the losses plus
compound interest the government has paid to Pool Re.
102. Lesley Hensell, Should the Feds Underwrite Terrorism Insurance?, Reality Times, 3, Nov. 15,




The first line of responsibility must be in place on the insured company. Once that is
firmly in place, it's fair to spread the risk as widely as possible, with the insurance
industry acting as the second buffer, and the government acting strictly as an insurer
of last resort" Weiss Ratings, an independent provider of ratings of the insurance
industry.
106. von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 79, at 10.
Pool Re is clearly a distortion of competition, since the Government provides one of
the suppliers with a stop-loss guarantee at zero cost. The Government apparently
believed that this was the best way to ensure that businesses could continue having low
cost insurance coverage against damages which could potentially be very high.
107. Id. ("If there is a broker between the insurance company and the customer, they get 2.5 percent
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and profits from investments, if it's resources exceed £1 billion the Government
has the right to recover any funds it may have provided.' °8
B. Pool Re's Flaws
Increased premiums have dogged Pool Re since its inception. "There is no
degree of price stability in the arrangements since the British government is
determined to ultimately pass costs on to the public. ... [I]f another big loss
occurs, there will be yet another public furor over the effectiveness of Pool
Re."' 09 While the government is borrowing money to pay for existing losses,
the debt increases and the burden is placed on the taxpayer.
Because one factor used in determining Pool Re coverage was location,
where one owned commercial property could significantly increase
policyholder's premiums. The areas found in the highest concentration of
terrorist activity originally had the highest rates. "Some property owners
experienced a three-fold increase in their total insurance premium. However,
as the funds in Pool Re have grown and the terrorist problem has subsided, rates
have been reduced."' 10
The definition of terrorism loss causes yet another concern. For example,
the Bishopsgate and St. Mary's Axe incidents were considered terrorism losses,
but the subsequent looting and thefts fell under the category of traditional
market losses."' Insurers are also having a difficult time with Pool Re." 2
While they are able to provide a degree of continued coverage where necessary
(with government support), they "have a very diversified client base and an
enormous administrative burden for which there is no reward unless they are
able to obtain specific fee increases from clients for these services."'
each.").
108. Id. (As of yet, the Government has not needed to intervene, so no monies have been provided
or returned.).
109. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 4.
110. Id.
Pool Re discounted rates by 40 percent in 1995 and substantially reduced them in
1999. Gross premiums reached a high point in 1994, at £369 million. Since then they
have fallen substantially, particularly as rates have been cut. In 2000, Pool Re's gross
written premium was £39 million. Despite the claims that have been paid, Pool Re's
surplus has grown significantly. As mentioned earlier, at the end of 2000, surplus was
approximately £665 million.
Ill. Fleming, supra note 9, at 4. ("Problems with the definition of terrorism could also arise in other
ways. For example, consider the London Flood Barrier. Does terrorism occur if extremiz.t destroy this barrier
and London is damaged by flood?").
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. ("One company, for example, has 30 full-time employees working solely on Pool Re issues.
When one extrapolates this burden to the many composite insurers and other firms throughout the United
Kingdom, one can appreciate the significant administration costs created by this system.")
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Another Pool Re problems lies with the policyholder's ability to get the
coverage they desire.1 4  Policyholders must decide whether they require
terrorism insure or to continue until the inevitable happens and hope their losses
are not great. It is a whole or nothing proposal where a firm that only is
interested in covering one portion of its business, but not the others, cannot
participate." 5
The government could also fund its contingent liability to the pool in
a variety of ways. It could charge the pool a premium ....
accumulating a fund it could use to pay for losses. ... [Tihe
government could fund its losses out of tax revenues, either with or
without repayment requirements." 6 The greatest problem is simply
this: If the event that is being insured against happens before the Pool
has collected enough premiums, or the premium rate was estimate too
low, the Pool's reserves would be insufficient to adequately cover the
act." 7 If this were to occur, the insurers would be obligated to pay all
legitimate claims regardless of whether they recovered funds from the
Pool." 8
"The ... Pool Re system is not working. [T]he system is failing because
it is committed to a reinsurance obligation for which there is insufficient
premium in the system to pay claims."' '9 The government, which has proceeded
to borrow money to meet existing claims, is only adding to its debt. There is no
exit strategy that will satisfy the insurance industry, and indicators show that the
government's "objective is to pass the risk back to the commercial market at the
first opportunity.""'
VI. THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN BACKING INSURERS
Prior to September 11, states regulate insurance companies, however, after
the WTC attacks; the federal government has taken an increased interest in the
insurance industry. 2 ' Each state has a guaranty funds that kicks in when an act
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. ("Unless there were totally separate policies and structures in force prior to the beginning
of 1993.").
116. Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers, Terrorism Insurance, Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, (2001) [hereinafter McCool]
(testimony of Thomas J. McCool, Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) p. 10.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Fleming, supra note 9, at 4.
120. Id.
121. Lawson, supra note 14, at 62.
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creates losses that the insurance companies cannot cover. 22 "Guaranty funds
are not operated by state governments, nor are they funded by public money
(i.e., there is no explicit subsidy). [T]he funds were created by statute and
operate as part of the insurance regulatory system." 3 But if the system fails,
the policyholder is left without options? Who will step in and ensure business
owners that they will be reimbursed for their losses?
Many insurance industry executives have supported various
recommendations that would rope in the Federal Government as a last resort.
24
Many have suggested the creation of a Pool system similar to the UK's Pool Re.
However, Treasury Department officials have had concerns about the
government creating and regulating the system."' Even if the pool was
chartered by an individual state, and federal funds were deposited, there is a
concern that at the very least, there would be some federal oversight involved. 126
President Bush has pushed forward his own plan, and has requested that
Congress pass legislation that would support federalizing terrorism insurance. 27
122. McCool, supra note 116, at 14.
123. Id. at 11.




127. Bill Sammon, Bush Says Senate Should Federalize Terror Insurance, THE WASH. TIMES, I
(Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020409-2383974.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2003). See also supra note 15.
And we need to do something on terrorism insurance, as well. This is an issue that I
don't think a lot of Americans understand very well, and we're going to use this
opportunity to explain it. I'm going to do my best to explain it. Tom Ridge and Larry
Lindsey will follow up. ... [Aind we have a lack of insurance coverage now as a result
of the enemy attack. I don't think they actually sat down and said, gosh, if we attack,
we'll affect the insurance industry of America. I think that was an unintended
consequence of theirs. But, nevertheless, it was a consequence. And we in Washington
must deal with it, and must deal with it in a hurry, because the pace of new
construction is dropping dramatically in America. Banks and investors, and others, will
not finance construction projects that do not have terrorism insurance. In order to build
a project, in order to employ people, you've got to borrow money, and you can't borrow
money unless there's adequate terrorism insurance. And that's not being provided
today.... And I expect the Congress to act. ... The Hyatt Corporation has acquired a
new site for a 1.5 million square foot office building in downtown Chicago. That ought
to be encouraging news. It ought to be encouraging news for my friend, the mayor. It
ought to be encouraging news for people who wear the hard hat and work, the
ironworkers and the construction workers. But they've got a problem finding terrorism
coverage, and so they're not getting financing for the project. Somebody wants to build
it; they can't get the money to do it because the insurance isn't available. This project
is valued at $400 million; will lead to the creation of 2,500 jobs, if the Hyatt
Corporation could get insurance.... We're worried about charities that may be forced
to cut back on services to the needy because of the high cost of insurance. Pension
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Without some decision, many policy-holders will feel the bite of not having the
proper coverage. Many customers have already faced this problem, including
the Miami Dolphins and the New York Giants (two professional football teams
in the National Football League) who lost terrorism coverage, and the Mall of
America in Minneapolis, "whose premiums have increased tenfold."'28
A December letter from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) President, Terri Vaughan, to Senate leaders Thomas
Daschle, D-S.D., and Trent Lott, R-Miss., expressed the concerns of the
organization if legislative action is not quickly taken.
The terrorist attacks on our country have created enormous
uncertainty in our nation's commercial property and casualty
insurance markets. We continue to believe the federal government
can and should play a critical, limited role in helping this marketplace
adjust to these new market realities. We are aware of the efforts the
Senate and the House of Representatives are putting forward to
funds for teachers and other workers that hold real estate assets may experience lower
rates of return because of higher terrorism insurance costs. That affects someone's
retirement system. ... The transportation industry will face strains from the lack of
affordable terrorism insurance. Secondly, while we're doing everything we can to stop
terrorist attacks, the economy must be prepared to handle an attack if they do occur.
We spend a lot of time here in Washington sniffing down every lead, looking for every
opportunity to run down a clue - somebody might be trying to get us. And I am
confident - I know we're doing everything we can, but I can't predict with 100 percent
accuracy whether or not another attack won't occur. And, therefore, we better find
terrorism insurance because, without it, it would be a catastrophic problem if there is
another attack. It would make it really hard for our economy to recover a second time
if there's an attack without adequate terrorism insurance. I mean, on the one hand we're
talking about jobs, and on the other hand we're talking about recovery if there's an
attack. Now, we passed a bill in the House that basically put the federal government
as a stopgap for terrorism insurance. Above a certain level of claim, the federal
government would step in. And that's important. And now it's in the Senate, and the
Senate needs to respond and act. The Senate needs to get this bill done quickly. All
they've got to do is talk to people in this room, Republicans and Democrats alike. This
isn't a bill that says, gosh, if it passes it'll help somebody's political party. That's not
what this is all about. This is a bill that helps workers and helps strengthen our
economy. This is an important piece of legislation. I've heard some talk in Capitol Hill
that the facts don't justify this type of legislation, the facts don't justify the federal
government stepping in as a stopgap. They're not looking at the right set of facts, as far
as I'm concerned. And so I expect, for the good of our economy, and for the good of
the country, that the Senate act. And I want to thank you all for your interest in this bill,
and I ask you to contact members of the United States Senate. We believe there is
bipartisan support for this bill. We believe that if it ever makes it to the floor, it passes.
And I know that we can work with the House version, if it's somewhat different, to get
something done quickly.
128. Id. at 3.
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advance this legislation. However, further delay will have a negative
impact on insurers and insurance consumers who in this instance are
predominantly the nation's business community.
Absent federal assistance, many businesses will be without
coverage for future losses related to acts of terrorism. In the event
insurance is still available, the costs may be unaffordable for many.
Anticipating this possibility, many insurers have asked state
regulators to grant terrorism exclusions against future losses. Some
carriers are indicating that beginning Jan. 1 they will not renew
workers' compensation coverage, a business necessity if an employer
is to retain employees. These steps will leave consumers without
protection. State insurance regulators must act on these requests in the
coming days, and we will be hard-pressed to deny many of these
specific requests in the absence of a federal 'backstop.' Otherwise,
we would be exposing the industry to potentially unmanageable
financial risks that would have consequences industry-wide and
among all insurance consumers. For these reasons, we urge action on
terrorism insurance legislation this year.' 29
Diane Koken, NAIC Northeast Chair and Pennsylvania Insurance
Commissioner, testified before the United State Senate's Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation a month after the WTC attacks. 3 ° She
said that the NAIC believed that the federal government should work with the
states to create a federal backstop that would be limited in scope and duration
in the event of another catastrophic attack. ' 3' While multiple plans are currently
being passed between Congressional committees, the NAIC recommendations
did not single out any one proposed plan. 132 However, it did provide guidelines
that the NAIC hoped would be an essential element of any plan ultimately
accepted and passed by Congress.133
129. Letter from Terri Vaughan, National Association of Insurance Commissioners President to
Congressional Members Thomas Daschle, D-S.D., and Trent Lott, R-Miss (Dec. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/rel01/121701_terrorism.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
130. Regarding: The Role of the Federal Government in Assuring that Insurance for Terrorist Acts
Remains Available to American Consumers, [hereinafter Koken] (October 30, 2001) (Testimony of Diane
Koken before the US Senate's Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation), p. 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (Diane Koken listed 19 criteria that the NAIC wished to be taken into consideration before
the federal government made a final conclusion to the federal backstop recommendation. They are:
1. Federal legislation in this area should "sunset" at a date certain of limited duration
after enactment in order to allow a reevaluation of the need for and design of the
program. 2. To take advantage of the substantial experience of state-based insurance
regulation, the expertise of the NAIC should be made available to any federal program
in this area and consideration should be given to including representatives of the NAIC
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Koken said that the insurance industry is well suited to cover the losses
incurred from the WTC attacks,'34 stating that the "industry is a $1 trillion
business with assets of more than $3 trillion."'35 Two examples of the insurance
industry's ability to react to disasters and reimburse policyholders who have
incurred losses are Hurricane Andrew and the California Northridge
Earthquake. In 1992 Andrew caused $19.7 billion in damages, and in 1994 an
as members of the governing body of such a program. 3. Federal legislation should
supplement but not replace other private and public insurance mechanisms where those
mechanisms can provide coverage more efficiently. 4. Federal legislation should
include clear and non-ambiguous definitions of terrorism to be applied to all policies
nationwide. 5. Rates should consider all reasonable factors that can be feasibly
measured and supported by theoretical and empirical analysis, including relative risk.
6. Federal legislation should encourage loss reduction and hazard mitigation efforts.
7. State residual market mechanisms and other pooling mechanisms providing
coverage should be allowed to participate in any program established by federal
legislation but in such a way as to not create incentives for business to be placed in
those residual markets. 8. Federal legislation should recognize that terrorism exposures
subject insurers to potential "adverse selection," i.e., entities with lower risk are less
likely to voluntarily purchase coverage, while those with greater risk are more likely
to purchase coverage. If possible, the federal program should encourage the inclusion
of both low-risk and high-risk entities to promote greater risk spreading in a way that
does not subject risk-bearing entities, including the federal government, to adverse
selection. 9. Federal legislation should address coverage and cost for all risks exposed
to terrorism, regardless of geographic, demographic or other classification, such as
"more-at-risk" or "less-at-risk." 10. There should be a safety net protection, within
reasonable limits, for any private program created by federal legislation in the event
of the insolvency of the program or its participants. 11. Tax law changes should be
encouraged to avoid penalties on and encourage the accumulation of reserves for the
portion of terrorism losses insurable in the private marketplace. 12. Federal legislation
should not unnecessarily preempt state authority. 13. Federal legislation should
encourage individuals and businesses to maintain private coverage for terrorism
exposure. 14. Federal legislation should promote or encourage awareness that coverage
is available for any property and/or casualty risk that meets reasonable standards of
insurability. 15. Federal legislation should encourage or mandate that eligible entities
participate in the program or run the risk of losing access to federal disaster assistance.
16. There should be an appropriate balance of the different private and public interests
in the governance of regulatory oversight over the program. 17. Federal legislation
should recognize the expertise of the states in insurance regulation with respect to such
areas as licensing insurers, solvency surveillance, oversight of rates and forms in most
jurisdictions, licensing producers, assisting policyholders and consumers during the
claim settlement process and performing market conduct examinations. 18. To more
efficiently achieve the objectives of any federal terrorism program, there should be
coordination of state and federal regulatory responsibilities. 19. Jurisdiction over
insurer claim settlement practices should remain with the states.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Koken, supra note 130, at 3. ("Preliminary loss estimates of $30 billion to $40 billion represent
just 3 to 4 percent of the premiums written in 2000.").
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earthquake cost $16.3 billion in insured losses. Insurers were able to respond
to the tragedy, and customers were reimbursed. 136
The insurance industry and federal government need to work together to
create a system that will honor all claims in the event of another terrorist attack.
However, as a result of the WTC attacks, many in the industry are concerned
about their ability to one, set an appropriate price for future terrorist acts, and
two, be able to compensate losses if the act is worse than estimated. "However,
even if we conclude that insurers cannot price and, therefore, cannot sell this
kind of insurance, defining the nature of the problem facing both the economy
and the insurance industry is a critical first step."
' 137
Recommendations for improving some of the problems insurers are facing
after the WTC attacks include establishing a uniform definition of terrorism and
creating a temporary federal financial backstop for terrorism insurance. 138 The
need to make these changes isn't one that results from the insurance industry not
being able to pay for the losses suffered in the September 11 attacks. "The
industry is going to pay its loss in the World Trade Center events, [but] if
terrorist attacks continue, this is an industry with finite capital."'
' 39
VII. EMERGING PLANS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
Several plans emerged to cover losses in the event of another terrorist
attack. President Bush's administration has recommended the creation of a pool
system similar to Britain's Pool Re. 4 ° Costs, divided between the federal
136. Id.
Following the tremendous losses from Hurricane Andrew, "commercial reinsurers
restricted their coverage for windstorms and raised prices. This caused a corresponding
reaction from primary insurers, who moved to raise prices, cancel coverage for coastal
properties, and increase deductible amounts for consumers having significant hurricane
exposure. Within a couple of years, normalcy returned to the reinsurance market, and
then to the primary market. The Florida Insurance Department assisted with the
recovery of the industry by introducing a moratorium on policy cancellations and
beginning the discussion of the need for a state catastrophe pool. The Florida
legislature later adopted a Hurricane Catastrophe Insurance Pool that provides a state-
based backstop for catastrophic windstorms in Florida. These collective actions have
resulted in a robust and competitive market for homeowners insurance in the State of
Florida.
137. McCool, supra note 116, at 1, 3.
138. Id. See also Koken, supra, note 130, at 2-3.
139. Hamburger, supra note 124. (Statements of Maurice Greenberg, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, American International Group, Inc.) (However, this statement seems to contradict the statements made
by NAIC N.E. Chair, Diane Koken.).
140. Federal Government, Insurers Debate Plan to Cover Future Terrorist Acts, Will Reinsurance
Rebound? 79 INSURANCE JOURNAL WEST, [hereinafter Insurers Debate] (October 29, 2001), 10,
available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/magazines/west/2001/I 0/29/coverstory/I 8300.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2003). See also Peter van Aartrijk, Jr., Can Terrorism Reinsurance Pool Calm Insurers' Fears?,
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government and insurers, would be an alternative to the industry's initial
proposal. The White House's plan would require the federal government to pay
80 percent of the first $20 billion of insured losses resulting from a terrorist.
Private insurers and reinsures would cover the remaining 20 percent. If losses
from a terrorist event amassed more than $20 billion in insured losses, the
government would pay 90 percent, and insurers would pay 10 percent.'
41
Several of the nation's largest insurers told the state insurance
commissions that this plan would hurt smaller companies... Insurers
are ... pushing for some sort of safety net, a terrorism pool to provide
reinsurance. The White House rejected this original proposal as
'anticompetitive' and 'too complex' for the limited time frame. 142
Two prevailing bills are in Congress, each passed in their respective
chambers. The House of Representatives passed the Terrorism Risk Protection
Act (H. R. 3210) in November. House Financial Services Committee Chairman
Michael G. Oxley said, "the bill establishes a temporary risk-spreading program
to shore up the insurance market and provide it with needed confidence and
certainty. The legislation requires little government regulation and would only
kick in if a terrorist event occurred.'
143
Passed in the House in November 2001, H.R. 3210 would provide for the
federal government to cover casualty and property damages resulting from
terrorist attacks.'" The government, over two years, would cover 90 percent of
any losses resulting from a terrorist act, and private insurers would cover the last
10 percent.
45
Federal aid would be triggered by industry-wide losses of at least $1
billion or 10 percent of the capital and surplus of any individual
company. The aid would be ... a loan to be repaid by the industry
What Independent Agents Can Expect with the Hard Market, available at
http://www.aartrijk.com/resources/articles/terrorism.reinsurance.htm. ("A week after the suicide hijackings,
insurance carrier executives and IIAA CEO Bob Rusbuldt reassured President Bush at an Oval Office meeting
that the estimated ... claims would be paid." ... "The CEO suggested a government-backed reinsurance pool
similar to that found in Great Britain.").
141. Federal Government, Insurers Debate Plan to Cover Future Terrorist Acts, supra note 140.
("After three years, the government would withdraw, allowing private insurers to take over.").
142. Id.
143. Press Release, House Committee on Financial, Oxley Commends AFL-CIO, Financial Services
Roundtable for Letter Urging Action on Terrorism Insurance (February 22, 2002), available at
http://financialservices.house.govlnews.asp?FormMode=release&id=77 (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
144. 144. Insurance Liability, supra note 16.
145. Id.
Neuwelt
through assessments spread across the companies over an extended
period of time.1
46
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (S. 2600), the rival bill to H.R. 3210,
was passed on the Senate floor on June 18, 2002.147 The bill, sponsored by Sen.
Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) and cosponsors Senate Majority Whip Harry Reid (D-
Nev.), Senate Banking Committee Chairman Paul Sarbanes (D-Nev.) and Sen.
Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), would "trigger if a terrorist attack caused at least $5
million in damages. The federal government would then pay 80 percent of
losses above each individual company's deductible for losses of up to $10
billion."' 14 8 The Act requires insurance companies to cover terrorist acts if the
resulting damage is up to $10 billion. "The federal government would cover 90
percent of losses greater than that amount during the first year of the possible
two-year program. If the Treasury secretary approves the program for a second
year, the threshold would rise to $15 billion."'149
These two bills are very different. The House bill is a "loan" program.
50
In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the federal government would loan insurers
up to $100 billion, but only after private insurance companies paid the first $1
billion. 151 The insurers who received the federal loan monies would be required
to repay the federal government, most likely pulling from earnings and premium
increases. This will likely cause customers to pay higher premiums.'52
Senate 2600 is a federally funded, short-term federal backstop program,
53
that
[s]ubstantially increases ... deductibles ... the industry ... pay[s]
before tax dollars are used to pay for losses ... [thereby] ensur[ing]
146. Id.
147. Press Release, IUABA Hails Senate Terrorism Insurance Vote; Calls Enactment "Necessary For
Consumers And The Economy", Senate Approves S. 2600 on 84-14 Vote, Independent Insurance Agents &
Brokers of America, Inc.,[hereinafter IIABA] (June 18, 2002), 1, available at
http://na.iiaa.org/Legislative/SenateTerrorismBillPR.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
148. Press Release, Senate Overwhelmingly Passes Terrorism Risk Insurance, Johnson Says the
Legislation Would Ensure the Availability and Affordability of Insurance Policies Throughout South Dakota
(June 18, 2002), available at http://johnson.senate.gov/-johnson/releases/200206/2002619A31.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2003).
149. IIABA, supra note 147, at 2. ("The bill also includes a per-company market share retention





153. Senate Passes Terrorism Insurance Bill (June 19 2002), available at
http://shoppingcenterworld.com/ar/retail-senatepasses.terrorism (last visited Mar. 12, 2003) (last visited
Mar. 12, 2003).
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that insurance companies will do all ... they can to protect ...
taxpayers ... through careful assessment of the risks involved with
each policy and the promotion of risk mitigation by their
customers. 
54
"Among other differences, S. 2600 leaves property owners susceptible to
punitive damages resulting from a terrorist attack. The ICSC and President
Bush himself have voiced opposition to placing limits on punitive damage
coverage for property owners, and Bush must sign the final bill."'55 President
Bush will veto any terrorism insurance bill that "allows punitive damages to be
assessed against United States businesses."'
156
H.R. 3210 and S 2600 both require losses, either aggregate industry losses
or from individual company losses, to reach a trigger level before federal
monies will be disbursed, both of which are caped at $100 billion.'57 H.R. 3210
has two triggers; the primary trigger starts when annual insured losses resulting
from terrorist attacks reach $1 billion.
When this occurs, all participating insurers can receive disbursements. If
terrorist attacks cause damages exceeding $100 million "and losses for at least
one insurer exceed both 10 percent of surplus and 10 percent of commercial
lines net written premium, then those specific insurers who are so affected are
eligible for payments" 15 under the bill's second trigger.
Once the main trigger of $1 billion is reached, insurers are reimbursed
for 90 percent of their losses above a $5 million deductible. In the
case of the secondary trigger, eligible insurers are reimbursed for 90
percent of their losses in excess of 10 percent of their net written
commercial lines premiums. 59
Under S. 2600, insurers are limited to what they can recover. Insurers are
limited to collecting losses, resulting from terrorist attacks, that exceed a
deductible equal to their commercial insurance market share times $10 billion,
154. Statement of United States Rep. John J. LaFalce, Ranking Member, House Financial Services
Committee, Regarding Senate Passage of S. 2600, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (June 18, 2002),
available at http://www.house.gov/banking-democrats/pr_-061802.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
155. Senate Passes Terrorism Insurance Bill, supra note 153.
156. United States Senate Passes Terrorism Risk Insurance Bill; Conference Committee To Iron Out
Partisan Differences, Professional Insurance Agents Ohio, available at
http:/www.ohiopia.comlLegislationlbulletinslsenate-passesjterrorismbill.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
157. Stephen P. Lowe, Estimating the Budgetary Impacts of the Proposed Federal Terrorism Risk




which is limited to $15 billion in the second year. 60 "In the case of S 2600, the
federal share of losses is 80 percent of losses in excess of the individual
company deductible, until losses reach $10 billion. Thereafter, the federal share
is 90 percent."' 1
61
Under H.R. 3210, insurers would be reimbursed $3.81 billion a year.
Under S 2600, insurers would receive $1.76 billion for the first year, program
and $1.44 billion the second year. If these plans began July 1, 2002, the
expected disbursements over five years under H.R. 3210 would be $6.6 billion
versus $2.8 billion for S 2600.162
H.R. 3210 requires ... disbursements ... be recovered via assessments
and surcharges, while S. 2600 does not. Under H.R. 3210, the first
$20 billion ... are to be recovered via assessments on commercial
insurers; ... disbursements in excess of $20 billion ... to be recouped
via earmarked surcharges on commercial insurance policies. 63
"In theory, the federal government should ultimately be able to recoup the
majority of any disbursements under H.R. 3210. Over an extended period the
only limitation on recoupment would be due to unrecoverable assessments on
insolvent insurers."' 6 Overcoming the differences between H.R. 3210 and S.
2600 will be a major hurdle that both the House and Senate may have difficulty
negotiating as the one-year anniversary of the WTC attack draws closer.
Vi. CONCLUSION
While Great Britain's Pool Re is a valuable system to assist the insurance
industry in the event of massive damages resulting from terrorism, it is not the
best program for America.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Lowe, supra note 157, at 3.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id.
Except for the first $5 billion of disbursements, assessments and surcharges in any
calendar year are limited to 3 percent of commercial lines net written premium, which
translates to an industry-wide overall annual dollar cap on recoveries of roughly $3.6
billion, based on our estimate of commercial lines direct written premium of $120
billion. In addition, H.R. 3210 provides the Secretary of the Treasury with considerable
latitude regarding the timing and administration of any assessments or surcharges. For
example, the Secretary may defer assessments on individual insurers to the extent that
the Secretary determines that a deferral is necessary to avoid insolvency. Similarly,
before imposing any surcharges, the Secretary is required to assess commercial
insurance market conditions and consider the impact of the surcharges on affordability
of commercial insurance.
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The United States insurance industry will survive the short-term
effects of September 11. It does not, however, have the capacity to
protect against another terrorist act of similar magnitude. ... [U]ntil
terrorism risk is eliminated or greatly reduced, United States
businesses ... will need [the federal] government to ... ensure ...
effective commerce ... continues.' 65
It will ultimately be a compromise of three principles; the willingness of
the federal government to come to the aid of the insurance industry under H.R.
3210, the guarantee of a federal backstop that will be the cornerstone of
terrorism insurance under S. 2600, and the willingness of our elected officials
to overcome political maneuvering that will ultimately decide the fate of
terrorism insurance. Between these, the ability of insurers and reinsurers to
meet the losses of their policyholders will be met. As the fall session of
Congress looms, attention from the insurance industry, policyholders, and the
media will be directed at lawmakers who struggle to find a compromise that will
ensure federal involvement and provide consumer confidence.
165. Lowe, supra note 12, at 1.
